Rethinking the Judicial Reception of Legislative Facts by Woolhandler, Ann
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Volume 41 
Issue 1 Issue 1 - January 1988 Article 3 
1-1988 
Rethinking the Judicial Reception of Legislative Facts 
Ann Woolhandler 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Jurisprudence Commons, and the Legislation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ann Woolhandler, Rethinking the Judicial Reception of Legislative Facts, 41 Vanderbilt Law Review 111 
(1988) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol41/iss1/3 
This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, 
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
ESSAY
Rethinking the Judicial Reception of
Legislative Facts
Ann Woolhandler*
Cultural influences have set up the assumptions about the mind, the body, and
the universe with which we begin; pose the questions we ask; influence the facts
we seek; determine the interpretation we give these facts; and direct our reaction
to these interpretations and conclusions.
- Gunnar Myrdal'
In a recent article, Professor Peggy Davis called for reforms in judi-
cial reception of legislative facts. 2 Her suggestions, which follow an em-
pirical analysis of the use of psychological parent theories in child
custody disputes, echo similar proposals by Professor Kenneth Karst in
1960s and by Professors Arthur Miller and Jerome Barron in 19751 for
judicial reception of legislative facts in constitutional cases.
As originally defined by Kenneth Culp Davis, legislative facts are
facts that "inform[] a court's legislative judgment on questions of law
and policy."5 They contrast with adjudicative facts, which are facts
about "what the parties did, what the circumstances were, what the
background conditions were."' The most commonly cited examples of
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati. My thanks to Charles Collier, Michael
Collins, Geoffrey Miller, Silas Wasserstrom, and George Wright.
1. G. MVRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 92 (1944).
2. Davis, "There is a Book Out. . .": An Analysis of Judicial Absorption of Legislative
Facts, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1539, 1603-04 (1987). As used in this Essay, "Davis" without a preceding
name or initial refers to Peggy Davis.
3. Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 Sup. CT. REv. 75; cf. D.
HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 274-84 (1977); Korn, Law, Fact and Science in the
Courts, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1080, 1090 (1966).
4. Miller & Barron, The Supreme Court, the Adversary System, and the Flow of Informa-
tion to the Justices, 61 VA. L. REv. 1187 (1975).
5. K. Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV.
L. REv. 364, 404 (1942).
6. Id. at 402.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
legislative facts are Louis Brandeis' recitation of opinions that working
women needed special protection in his brief in Muller v. Oregon, and
the social science appendix detailing the deleterious effects of segrega-
tion on black children in Brown v. Board of Education." Discussions of
the judicial reception of legislative facts implicate questions of the role
of social science in law,9 the scope of judicial notice, 10 and, more gener-
ally, the process of judicial decisionmaking. 11
Because assumptions about disputable general facts are necessary
to any reasoning process, the advisory committee on the Federal Rules
of Evidence declined to prescribe formal rules for the reception of legis-
lative facts when providing standards for judicial notice. 2 The advisory
committee believed that judicial absorption of general nonlegal knowl-
edge should not be circumscribed by "any limitation in the form of in-
disputability, any formal requirements of notice other than those
already inherent in affording opportunity to hear and be heard and ex-
changing briefs, and any requirement of formal findings at any level."13
Rather, according to the advisory committee, the process of judicial re-
ception of legislative facts should parallel the court's methodology in
determining domestic law, in which
the judge is unrestricted in his investigation and conclusion. He may reject the
propositions of either party or of both parties. He may consult the sources of perti-
nent data to which they refer, or he may refuse to do so. He may make an indepen-
dent search for persuasive data or rest content with what he has or what the parties
present.. .. [T]he parties do no more than to assist; they control no part of the
process. '
In administrative process, in contrast to judicial process, however,
reception of general data to inform the agency in its lawmaking func-
tions is regularized in notice and comment rulemaking procedures. 5
The regular reception of legislative facts by administrative agencies
flows from the open acknowledgement of the agencies' legislative
functions.
7. 208 U.S. 412, 419 (1908).
8. 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954).
9. See N. CHANNELS, SOCIAL SCIENCE METHODS IN LEGAL PROCESS 5-8 (1985); see also
Monahan & Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in
Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 488-95 (1986); Walker & Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of
Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559, 559-60 (1987).
10. See, e.g., K. Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 COLUm. L. REV. 945, 982-83 (1955); see also Rob-
erts, Preliminary Notes Toward a Study of Judicial Notice, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 210 (1967).
11. E.g., P. FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 87-91 (1949); Alfange, The Rel-
evance of Legislative Facts in Constitutional Law, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 637 (1966); Karst, supra note
3, at 78-81.
12. FED. R. EVID. 201(a) advisory committee's note.
13. Id.
14. Id. (quoting Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 HARV. L. REV. 269, 270-71 (1944)).
15. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982).
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Professors Davis, Karst, Miller, and Barron see a problem in the
haphazard way in which courts receive legislative facts. They believe
courts should embrace more openly their legislative functions by adopt-
ing procedures better suited to making general, prospective rules.,'
These reformists claim that lawyers fail to understand the importance
of presenting general data to assist courts in fashioning legal rules, and
that courts are insensitive to the need to seek out facts about the gen-
eral effects of the legal rules they create, rather than relying on unsup-
ported assumptions or one-sided presentations. 17  Their suggested
remedies range from such unexceptionable proposals as increased so-
phistication on the part of lawyers and judges,' and judicial requests
for further presentations by parties and amici,' to more ambitious
goals such as adoption of formal rules of evidence,20 and appointment of
independent experts and scientific panels.2
Because it is difficult to argue against courts' knowing more about
the effects of the legal rules they create, no one criticizes these propos-
als. But no one has followed them either, despite their twenty-seven
year persistence. This Essay will first address why no one has followed
these proposals, and then discuss why this is a good thing.
I. PARADIGMS OF LEGISLATIVE AND ADJUDICATIVE FACTS
Paradigms of adjudicative and legislative facts suggest why lawyers
present and courts receive legislative facts in such a willy-nilly fashion.
Adjudicative facts are the stuff of ordinary litigation. The paradigm of
an adjudicative fact is a description of a past, individual physical or
mental phenomenon, the proof of which is in the record. The retrospec-
tive and discrete nature of the inquiry gives a sense that there is one
true version of the happening,22 even if the truth-finding process neces-
sarily consists in an ad hoc assessment of probability.23 Determinations
that a defendant in a negligence case failed to stop at a stop sign, or
16. Davis, supra note 2, at 1600; Karst, supra note 3, at 78-81; Miller & Barron, supra note
4, at 1189, 1199.
17. Davis, supra note 2, at 1595, 1599, 1601-02; Karst, supra note 3, at 75-76, 91-92, 98;
Miller & Barron, supra note 4, at 1211, 1228, 1242.
18. Davis, supra note 2, at 1598; Karst, supra note 3, at 99, 107; Miller & Barron, supra note
4, at 1242.
19. Davis, supra note 2, at 1598-1600, 1603; Karst, supra note 3, at 106; Miller & Barron,
supra note 4, at 1243.
20. Davis, supra note 2, at 1603; Miller & Barron, supra note 4, at 1239-40.
21. Davis, supra note 2, at 1600; Miller & Barron, supra note 4, at 1240; see also P. ROSEN,
THE SUPREME COURT AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 201-02 (1972).
22. Cf. J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 191 (1898).
23. Schmoalbeck, The Trouble with Statistical Evidence, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 221, 232
(1986); Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARv. L. REV.
1329, 1330 n.2, 1345-46 (1971).
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that a defendant in a criminal prosecution shot a victim, are examples
of adjudicative facts. Once the trier of fact determines these facts, it
then applies pre-existing legal rules to those facts to reach a decision.24
Adjudicative facts thus designate "what exists, in contrast with what
should, rightfully, exist, . . . things, events, actions, conditions, as hap-
pening, existing, really taking place."25 These value-neutral facts are
distinguishable from laws, which attach state-enforced consequences to
facts, and thus are necessarily normative.
In contrast to adjudicative facts, legislative facts do not presume a
pre-existing legal norm because by definition such facts are used to cre-
ate law. A paradigmatic legislative fact is one that shows the general
effect a legal rule will have,2" and is presented to encourage the deci-
sionmaker to make a particular legal rule. There is less a sense that
legislative facts are true or knowable because such facts are predictions,
and, moreover, typically predictions about the relative importance of
one factor in causing a complex phenomenon .2 Examples of legislative
facts include evidence that strict liability leads to efficient resource allo-
cation, or that the death penalty does not deter crime, which is
presented respectively to convince the court to adopt strict liability or
strike down the death penalty.
The key difference between adjudicative and legislative facts is not
the characteristics of particular versus general facts, but rather, evi-
dence whose proof has a more established place and more predictable
effect within a framework of established legal rules as distinct from evi-
dence that is more manifestly designed to create the rules. The line be-
tween adjudicative and legislative facts is indistinct, however, because
decisionmakers use even the most particularized facts to make legal
rules. For instance, courts may treat adjudicative facts as exemplary of
the effects of legal rules.2 A court, for example, may view one indigent
defendant's inability to defend himself without a court-appointed law-
yer as representative of the plight of others, and conclude therefrom
that due process requires court-appointment of lawyers for indigent de-
fendants.29 In addition, once the decisionmaker finds even the most in-
24. Cf. J. THAYER, supra note 22, at 192-93.
25. Id. at 191 (definitions of fact).
26. See Karst, supra note 3, at 81, 98, 103.
27. See id. at 98. Brandeis' use of legislative facts was not to show that the facts were true,
but that reasonable legislators could believe they were true. See P. FREUND, supra note 11, at 88;
Roberts, supra note 10, at 228; see also E. CLEARY, McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE § 331, at 929-30 (3d
ed. 1984).
28. Karst, supra note 3, at 77; cf. Davis, supra note 2, at 1548.
29. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 337 (1963); see also D. HOROWITZ, supra note 3, at
45, 266-67 (discussing the problem of courts making policy based on atypical facts of particular
cases).
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dividual facts, lawmaking occurs in the application of a pre-existing,
general legal standard to those facts.3 0 For example, by determining
that particular statistics in a Title VII case show intentional discrimina-
tion on the part of an employer, a court makes law in that particular
case by establishing the predicate for an exercise of state power. 1 That
same determination also may have precedential effect. Nevertheless,
when courts make law by applying a general standard to particular
facts, the lawmaking is likely to be more interstitial and less self-
conscious than when courts make law upon proof of general facts.2 In
the latter case, the participants will have a greater sense of creating the
framework of law rather than of merely filling in the gaps.
33
Judges always have made predictions about the general effects of
legal rules when deciding cases, such as the deterrent effect of punish-
ment."' Louis Brandeis began presenting general facts,3 5 which Kenneth
Culp Davis later renamed "legislative facts" because the Realists
frankly recognized the courts' lawmaking function .3  After all, it only
makes sense to provide courts with data to assist in their lawmaking
function if one sees courts as having such a function, as distinguished
from a function of discovering law that is dictated by text, precedent,
and principle.3 7
Legislative facts, moreover, when defined as predictions about the
effects of legal rules, are necessarily of greater significance when one
embraces the instrumental view of law that grew out of the Realist era,
that a good legal rule is one that causes a desirable social end s.3 A logi-
30. Bohlen, Mixed Questions of Law and Fact, 72 U. PA. L. REV. 111, 114 (1924); see also 0.
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 126 (1881); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 553-
54 (1965).
31. See L. JAFFE, supra note 30, at 552.
32. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 113-14 (1921).
33. The logical collapse of the distinction between legislative and adjudicative facts at the
law-application phase has led to some dissatisfaction with the distinction, see Monahan & Walker,
supra note 9, at 484 n.25, and to creation of a third category of background or social framework
evidence. See Walker & Monahan, supra note 9, at 570; see also Davis, supra note 2, at 1547.
Professors Monahan and Walker define social framework evidence as the use of general conclu-
sions from social science research in determining factual issues in a specific case. The evidence
could be seen as an attempt to create ad hoc presumptions. See infra text accompanying notes 56-
64.
34. See Roberts, supra note 10, at 236 (indicating that "judicial notice is the art of thinking
as practiced within the legal system" (emphasis in original)).
35. The Brandeis brief was not entirely a Brandeis innovation. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S.
113, 130-31 (1876).
36. See Monahan & Walker, supra note 9, at 483. Legal realism was a reaction to the late
nineteenth-century formalist view that legal decisions would be deduced logically from general
principles. The Realists focused instead on what actually transpired in the courts, and on the
effects of legal decisions. See W. REISMAN & A. SCHREIBER, JURISPRUDENCE 434-83 (1987).
37. See K. Davis, supra note 5, at 407.
38. See Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 952, 958
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cal doctrinal application of this pragmatic view of law, as Professor
Alexander Aleinikoff recently pointed out, is balancing."' In an age of
pragmatic balancing, one would ask for a change in a legal rule by
showing empirically that the rule will not advance the end it was sup-
posed to, or that it will hurt other ends to a greater extent than was
previously assumed, and that another rule better advances social ends.
Professor Karst's call in 1960 for increased sophistication in the judicial
reception of legislative facts was an explicit defense of balancing against
more categorical approaches to constitutional law.40 Pragmatic balanc-
ing is now so commonly accepted that Professors Miller, Barron, and
Davis did not explicitly defend it, but took it for granted in their calls
for reform in the reception of legislative facts.4'
II. UNPREDICTABILITY: LAWMAKING
If pragmatic balancing were the only game in town, one would ex-
pect lawyers to present legislative facts more frequently, and courts to
have heeded the perennial calls for more sensitivity in receiving such
facts. One reason this has not happened is that pragmatism is not yet
the only game in town. Lawyers have yet to view themselves as lobby-
ists or judges to view themselves as legislators. Rather, lawyers and
judges continue to see the judicial process as one in which text, prece-
dent, and principle still play a significant role. To the extent that non-
pragmatic reasoning informs judicial decisionmaking, legislative
factfinding is less important.42
(1987); Pound, The Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence, Chairman's Address, 31 A.B.A. REP.
911, 917-21, 925-26 (1907).
39. Aleinikoff, supra note 38, at 958. Professor Aleinikoff defines a "balancing opinion" in
the context of constitutional interpretation as "a judicial opinion that analyzes a constitutional
question by identifying interests implicated by the case and reaches a decision or constructs a rule
of constitutional law by explicitly or implicitly assigning values to the identified interests." Id. at
945.
40. Karst, supra note 3, at 77-81; see also Alfange, supra note 11, at 644 (arguing against
judicial absolutism in urging courts to consider legislative facts).
41. Professor Davis calls for courts to take a more critical look at psychological parent theo-
ries as predictors of a child's best interests, so that the predictions can be weighed against the
biological parents' constitutionally based interests in raising their children. Davis, supra note 2, at
1589, 1602. The courts, she recommends, should supplement expert psychological evidence "with
close examination of the social function served by a tradition of assigning responsibility on the
basis of biological parentage (and the social costs of diluting the effect of that assignment), and
recognize that scientific consensus concerning the expert's causal judgment may be lacking or tem-
porary." Id. at 1602. Professors Miller and Barron state that:
the function of briefs and argument in formative Supreme Court decisions is not to inform
the Court as to what rule of "law" in any traditional sense the Court is compelled to apply.
Rather, it is to offer some empirical data or law-policy hypothesis which counsel anticipate
the Court already has a predisposition to accept.
Miller & Barron, supra note 4, at 1208.
42. For discussions of alternatives to pragmatism, see R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986);
LEGISLATIVE FACTS
Even when pragmatism plays a significant role in judicial decision-
making, however, the effect of a particular showing of legislative fact on
a decision is inherently unpredictable. Because legislative facts are used
to create legal rules, proof of legislative facts cannot have a predeter-
mined effect under existing legal rules. Lawyers regularly present cer-
tain types of evidence, whether general or particular, when that
evidence has an established place in a pre-existing legal framework.
Thus, the more a particular kind of fact resembles an adjudicative
fact-i.e., one whose proof will have particular consequences because
there are pre-existing legal rules that make it significant-the more
likely it is that attorneys will present such facts and courts will become
adept at handling them. But the concept of legislative fact assumes that
the legal rules are not formulated in advance, since the evidence is
presented to assist the court in its normative function of making up
such rules. Once an attorney proves legislative facts, moreover, these
facts are balanced against the other social harms and benefits that the
legal rule is shown or presumed to produce."3 The pragmatic jurispru-
dence that encourages showings of legislative fact thus also makes the
effect of any particular showing unpredictable; while there may be
agreement that the law is instrumental, there is no agreement as to the
ends it should be instrumental in producing or how such ends should be
weighed against one other.4
The reformists acknowledge that showings of legislative facts can
change a legal rule only to the extent that "values" do not continue to
support the rule."5 The reformists feel compelled to regulate judicial re-
ception of legislative facts, however, because they overstate the impor-
tance that provable legislative facts may have in judicial decisions. 46
Aleinikoff, supra note 38, at 944, 988, 995, 1002-03; and Regan, The Supreme Court and State
Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091 (1986).
Critiques of balancing generally encompass both ad hoc and definitional balancing. See Aleinikoff,
supra note 38, at 948; Regan, supra, at 1153 n.106. Definitional balancing establishes a principle of
general application. See M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 2.03 (1984).
43. See Aleinikoff, supra note 38, at 977 (asserting that balancing transforms any interest
implicated by a constitutional case into a constitutional interest).
44. See Karst, supra note 3, at 85.
45. Karst, supra note 3, at 84-89, 92; see also Korn, supra note 3, at 1091, 1095-96.
46. E.g., Karst, supra note 3, at 89 (stating that "[w]hatever the weight of the presumption
of constitutionality in a particular case, the legislative facts must make up the rest of the bal-
ance"). Professor Hazard has stated aptly:
I believe that most, if not all, questions of legal principle can be reduced to a series of constit-
uent questions of fact. The task of doing so is laborious, and not all questions of fact so
formulated are susceptible of investigation yielding reliable results. In any event, the process
of reduction entails retraction of the generality and therefore the practical interest of the
propositions under consideration. Indeed, when the process of reduction has advanced far
enough to make the question scientifically meaningful, it usually results in making the pro-
position trivial for any immediate legal purpose.
1988]
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Professors Davis, Karst, Miller, and Barron do this not only because
they overemphasize pragmatic balancing, but also because they fail to
appreciate how changeable the support for a legal rule will be even if
courts thoroughly embrace pragmatisin. Other effects, presumed or
proved, may be called upon to outweigh a particular showing of legisla-
tive fact.4 7
This is not to deny, however, that showings of legislative facts may
be important to particular cases. But there is no special need to adopt
formal procedures for the judicial reception of legislative facts. Recom-
mendations for solicitation of amici curiae and appointment of indepen-
dent experts and scientific panels are aimed at giving courts a more
balanced presentation to alleviate the effects of one-sided presentations
that result from imbalances in litigation resources. But when lawyers
perceive that a particular showing will affect the outcome in a case,
they tend to make such a showing, which courts tend to receive. If the
court relies on an imbalanced presentation in one case, attorneys with
sufficient resources and sophistication are likely to respond in later
cases with counter-presentations. Explicit judicial reliance on im-
balanced information thus creates its own incentive for correction by
showing attorneys what kinds of facts just might make a difference to
the court. One cannot necessarily say that these presentations will
change the prior legal rule, or that their effect might not have been
different if presented before an earlier rule crystallized. But one can say
that it is unlikely that over time a contestable scientific or social scien-
tific study that is made the explicit basis of a court decision will remain
unchallenged.48
Hazard, Limitations on the Uses of Behavioral Science in the Law, 19 CASE W. RES. 71, 76 (1967).
47. This is shown by the Supreme Court's decision in McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756
(1987), which upheld Georgia's death penalty in the teeth of a showing of intentional racial dis-
crimination in its administration. Whether one calls the study that was presented in McCleskey
legislative or adjudicative fact, one would expect it to have a good chance at making a difference in
the outcome because the antidiscrimination principle is one of the few overarching principles of
American constitutional law. See Brest, In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 6 (1976). To the extent the Court accepted the study as showing discrimination, see
infra note 64, however, the showing was outweighed by majoritarian preferences for retribution
and assumed deterrence, and the need for discretion in administering the criminal justice system.
McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1769-70, 1775, 1777. Throwing "discretion" into the balance has a certain
irony. Jurors themselves are allowed to weigh individual factors, including, as it turns out, the race
of defendant and victim, in an ad hoc process that brings the ultimate coercive power of the state
to bear on the defendant, thus mirroring the court's own ad hoc lawmaking in which intentional
racial discrimination is just another factor to consider.
48. Professor Davis raises a problem of systemic resource imbalance in contests between the
state and biological parents over custody and termination of parental rights. Her own study seems
to show, however, that biological parents with sufficient resources eventually aired opposing view-
points in the courts. See Davis, supra note 2, at 1590.
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III. UNPREDICTABILITY: FACTFINDING
Thus far this Essay has been directed only to the judicial reaction
to legislative facts once these facts have been proved. Much of the writ-
ing on legislative facts similarly treats the overtly normative process of
lawmaking as analytically distinct from factfinding, which is supposed
to be value-neutral. The commentators thus sharply distinguish fact
and value, and assume that it is the "value" component of legal rules
that limits the effects of showings of legislative facts.49 Professors John
Monahan and Laurens Walker have stated: "The principal similarity
between social science and fact is that both are positive-both concern
the way the world is, with no necessary implications for the way the
world ought to be."50 Such claims that legislative facts are value-
neutral, and that decisionmakers can accurately find them with appro-
priate procedures, underlie the supposed legitimacy of the reformist
proposals.5 1 But, as Gunnar Myrdal's observation highlights, 2 the
factfinding process is itself value-driven, both when experts and courts
find the facts. The normative component of factfinding is heightened
for legislative factfinding, which adds unpredictability to the effects of a
showing of legislative fact even before the lawmaking phase.
Claims for value-neutrality of legislative facts are belied by the
very nature of a legislative fact.5 ' A legislative fact provides evidence of
the importance of one particular factor in causing a complex phenome-
non. The scientist or social scientist asks a question and interprets data
based on a pre-existing hypothesis about causation; this is true even for
the hard sciences and especially true for the soft sciences, which typi-
cally serve as the source for legislative facts.5 Courts in turn have their
own theories of causation that affect their evaluation of the evidence.
One's beliefs about causation are closely tied to one's beliefs about
desirable effects. For example, if one sees a racially integrated society as
a desirable end, one may also view the current segregated society as
49. See Karst, supra note 3, at 85. Karst nonetheless concedes that social scientists have axes
to grind, which implies that social science data are not value-neutral. Id. at 105.
50. Walker & Monahan, supra note 9, at 585 (emphasis added); Monahan & Walker, supra
note 9, at 489 (emphasis in original).
51. See Karst, supra note 3, at 75-76; Miller & Barron, supra note 4, at 1228, 1235-36. Pro-
fessor Davis' proposals rely more on a fairness rationale. See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
52. See supra text accompanying note 1.
53. See E. CLEARY, supra note 27, § 331, at 930.
54. See T. KUHN, THE ESSENrIAL TENSION 327-39 (1977); see also R. LEvINs & R. LEWONTIN,
THE DIALECTICAL BIOLOGIST 4-5 (1985) (indicating that "nothing evokes as much hostility among
intellectuals as the suggestion that social forces influence or even dictate either the scientific
method or the facts and theories of science"); S. GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 22 (1981) (stat-
ing that "some topics are invested with enormous social importance but blessed with very little
reliable information. When the ratio of data to social impact is so low, a history of scientific atti-
tudes may be very little more than an oblique record of social change").
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resulting from forces other than individual merit. A view that racial in-
tegration is undesirable frequently accompanies a view that individual
merit is a strong causative factor in the current segregation of society.5
Pre-existing views about the causes of desirable and undesirable ef-
fects govern social scientists' development of legislative facts, such as
Kenneth Clark's showing that segregation harms black children's self-
esteem 56 and David Baldus' study that racial discrimination plays a
part in the imposition of the death sentence.57 In addition, courts have
their own views of desirable effects and their causes, which affect the
courts' perceptions of the probative value of these showings. When a
judge's view of causation systematically differs from our own, we call it
bias. When statutes and the common law incorporate background as-
sumptions about causation into formal rules for the reception of evi-
dence, we call them presumptions. Writers on evidence routinely
recognize that presumptions may reflect judicially accepted views of
probability (i.e., causation) as well as policies about who should bear
the risks of uncertainty (i.e., choices of desirable effects).58 Views about
causation and desirable effects, however, tend to be intertwined.59
Every factfinder has his own set of presumptions that affect his
factfinding6 0 This is true of all kinds of facts, which lawyers obviously
understand when they worry about which judges and jurors will decide
their cases. Decisionmakers may find it inherently easier to reject legis-
lative facts than adjudicative facts, however, since legislative facts are
predictive rather than retrospective. Because the decisionmaker uses
legislative facts to make legal rules, moreover, fewer formal presump-
tions are likely to govern reception of legislative facts or to mitigate the
decisionmaker's personal presumptions. Of course, if legislative facts
merely reinforce pre-existing presumptions, as they did in Brown v.
55. See Brest, supra note 47, at 7-8; Fallon & Weiler, Firefighters v. Stotts: Conflicting Mod-
els of Racial Justice, 1984 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 12-26; Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition: School Deseg-
regation and the Corrective Ideal, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 728, 731-35 (1986) (describing prohibitory,
corrective, and distributive conceptions of racial justice). Individual merit may be seen as consist-
ing of choices the individual has made or innate ability. See S. GOULD, supra note 54, at 20.
56. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954).
57. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 1763-64 (1987).
58. See, e.g., E. CLEARY, supra note 27, § 343, at 968-69.
59. Cf. Curtis, discussion following Freund, Review of Facts in Constitutional Cases, in Su-
PREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 52 (E. Cahn 2d ed. 1971).
60. L. JAFFE, supra note 30, at 552 (stating that "[tihe process of inference from evidence to
fact is based on 'reasoning,' on the application of the finder's theory of experience.. . . The expert
accumulating experience evolves theories of probability. These are not rules of law but they are
rules, and insofar as the law holds that they are sufficient to validate a finding the law in a sense
adopts them as rules of law" (emphasis omitted)); Tribe, supra note 23, at 1347-50 (discussing
subjective probabilities); Finkelstein & Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to Identification Evidence,
83 HARV. L. REV. 489, 505 (1970) (same).
[Vol. 41:111
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Board of Education,61 the reception of legislative facts is likely to be
sympathetic and unremarkable.2 The evaluation of the statistical evi-
dence of racial bias in McCleskey v. Kemp 63 shows the fate of legisla-
tive facts that seek to undermine pre-existing legal and personal
presumptions that discrimination is not an important causative factor
in the disproportionate racial effects of the death penalty.6 4
The normative component of legislative factfinding enhances the
unpredictability of the effects of showings of legislative facts, even
before the facts that are found are thrown into the pragmatic balance of
lawmaking. This unpredictability discourages attorneys from presenting
legislative facts, which in turn discourages courts from formalizing pro-
cedures for their reception.
IV. THE UNDERSIDE OF KNOWING MORE
It may be argued that courts should regularize the process for re-
ception of legislative facts even if the relationship of a showing of legis-
lative fact to outcome is tenuous. There is, however, an underside to
regularizing the process of judicial reception. Formalizing the process
for judicial reception of legislative facts will increase the hegemony of
pragmatic balancing at the expense of other processes of judicial rea-
soning. Increasing the influence of pragmatic balancing in judicial deci-
sionmaking will make the judicial process look more like the legislative
and administrative processes, and will undermine the legitimacy of the
courts.
61. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
62. Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 159-60 (1955); see also Freund, supra note
59, at 49 (presumption of constitutionality indulged more comfortably by court if buttressed by
some evidence).
63. 107 S. Ct. 1756 (1987).
64. The majority concluded that the statistical showing failed to prove discrimination against
McCleskey. Id. at 1766-69. The decision thus manifests overarching questions about the evaluation
of statistical evidence of discrimination that flow from different views of the causes of the plight of
blacks in American society (i.e., discrimination versus individual merit). In a garden variety Title
VII case, the trial judge's views about causation typically manifest themselves in questions about
whether to accept the plaintiff's statistics, which the defendant will claim do not take into account
a sufficient number of factors. With enough factors, the defendant will claim that he can show that
his decisions were the product of merit and not discrimination. The Reagan administration has
taken this argument to the extreme: statistics can never show discrimination because discrimina-
tion only exists as a discrete, aberrational phenomenon. Under this view, the general racial dispari-
ties in American society ultimately derive from merit (or other factors with which we should not
concern ourselves), and therefore statistics can never take into account all the relevant factors. The
Supreme Court effectively adopted this position in death penalty litigation. See id. at 1767-68; Van
den Haag, Comment on John Kaplan's "Administering Capital Punishment," 36 U. FLA. L. REV.
193, 199 (1984) (stating that "[gluilt is personal. That someone else, 'equally' guilty, got away with
murder, be it because of some random factor, or because of discrimination, intended or unin-
tended, does not make the murderer to be sentenced less guilty").
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The reformists maintain that courts should embrace more openly
their legislative functions.6 5 Because courts inevitably make law, the ar-
gument goes, courts should use decisionmaking processes that are ap-
propriate for making general, prospective rules.6 That is, courts should
institutionalize the reception of information about the general, prospec-
tive effects of their decisions, including the effects on unrepresented or
underrepresented parties. Although the reformists fail to say so, their
reforms would make courts look more like administrative agencies,
which combine rulemaking and adjudication, and for which the
processes for reception of legislative facts already are in place.
The reformists must address questions of legitimacy that are raised
by the open embrace of legislative functions by the courts,67 since many
people already attack courts for arrogating legislative powers. The re-
formists claim that regularizing judicial reception of legislative facts
would enhance legitimacy, because courts would make "better" deci-
sions.6 8 Their claim for better judicial decisions has a substantive and
procedural component. The reformists claim judicial decisions will be
better substantively because decisions will be more "accurate," which
will enhance their legitimacy. 9 They claim decisions will be better pro-
cedurally because viewpoints of a wider variety of persons who will be
affected by the legal rules will come to the courts' attention. The re-
formists' arguments parallel claims for legitimacy of administrative pro-
cess through expertise and interest representation.
A. Expertise
When the reformists claim that legitimacy will come from the in-
creased accuracy of judicial decisions, they are claiming that science can
neutrally answer legal questions.7 0 With processes for the courts to edu-
cate themselves about the general effects of legal rules in place, facts
rather than discretion will determine the outcome of cases. New Dealers
sometimes made similar claims in response to criticisms of the delega-
65. Davis, supra note 2, at 1600; Karst, supra note 3, at 78-80; Miller & Barron, supra note
4, at 1189-90, 1243.
66. Davis, supra note 2, at 1599-1600; Miller & Barron, supra note 4, at 1201-02, 1232-38,
1245; cf. B. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 20 (1"83) (call for statements of fact that
relate individual conflicts to systematic structural tensions of social life).
67. See D. HOROWITZ, supra note 3, at 298 (while calling for improvements in courts' ability
to deal with general categories transcending individual cases, noting that such innovations may
erode the distinctive contribution of courts to social order).
68. Karst, supra note 3, at 111-12; see also P. ROSEN, supra note 21, at 229.
69. Karst, supra note 3, at 75-76, 111; Miller & Barron, supra note 4, at 1228, 1230.
70. See Karst, supra note 3, at 92; Miller & Barron, supra note 4, at 1238-39; see also N.
CHANNELS, supra note 9, at 13 (indicating that "[a]s courts and administrative agencies become
more familiar with social science methodology and findings, issues will increasingly be seen as em-
pirical questions, answerable by quantitative data").
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tion of broad discretion to administrative agencies." According to some
New Dealers, administrative discretion was more apparent than real be-
cause the specialized knowledge of the administrator would guide the
agency towards achieving its goal.72 The legislative fact reformists simi-
larly believe that expertise will limit judicial discretion. Professors
Miller and Barron maintain that if the Supreme Court adopted their
suggestions for more complete presentations of legislative facts, "the
Court would cede some of its present freedom in determining, as Chief
Justice Warren once said, what is best for the American people. 7' Pro-
fessor Karst similarly stated that,
Emphasis on the legislative facts points a way out of the difficulties-presumed or
real-raised by the call for neutrality. If such neutral principles do exist, and if we
are to derive our decisions from them, then it takes no argument to show that a
court will do a better job of deciding if it has been adequately informed as to the
factual links between the challenged governmental action and the neutral princi-
ples involved.
7 4
The claims for legitimacy through the greater accuracy that more
formalized reception of legislative facts is thought to entail ultimately
fail just as similar claims for legitimacy through expertise failed in the
context of administrative agencies. The reason lies in the nature of leg-
islative facts. Legislative facts are predictions about the effects of legal
rules and are by their nature disputable. The creation and reception of
legislative facts will be governed by pre-existing presumptions about
desirable effects and their causes. 5 Legislative facts, moreover, cannot
neutrally provide answers to legal questions because by definition legis-
lative facts are used to make the rules that pose the questions. Al-
though legislative facts provide information for the pragmatic balancing
of desirable effects, these "facts" cannot tell us what effects are desira-
ble, or how to weigh them. Similarly, claims that the expertise of ad-
ministrative agencies limited their discretion failed with the decline in
the belief that the public interest served by the agency was objectively
ascertainable.7 ' The reformists' claims that regularized reception of leg-
islative facts will lead to better substantive decisions ultimately fails
71. See Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HAv. L. REv. 1667,
1678 (1975).
72. Id.
73. Miller & Barron, supra note 4, at 1243.
74. Karst, supra note 3, at 111. Professor Davis' proposals seem less grounded in a theory
that science has answers, although she criticizes some courts for failure to analyze "the empirical
research or theories of child development to which one might turn to determine the 'correctness' of
the [conflicting experts'] views." Davis, supra note 2, at 1557.
75. To the extent there is consensus about such effects and their causes, formal procedures
for reception of legislative facts are insignificant. To the extent there is no such agreement, the
legislative facts will not provide "answers" of compelling legitimacy.
76. Stewart, supra note 71, at 1678, 1683.
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because of the reformists' own inability to tell us what is a good
decision."
B. Interest Representation
If the reformist proposals cannot supply legitimacy through exper-
tise, they must rely on claims that judicial decisions will derive legiti-
macy from procedural fairness. Professor Davis' proposals rely on this
rationale.78 All the reformists, however, rely on a notion that, because
courts make law for parties other than the litigants, courts need to de-
velop techniques for obtaining the views of, or effects on, the unrepre-
sented or underrepresented. 9  Thus if legislative facts cannot
necessarily guarantee substantively more accurate results, courts will at
least have considered all the alternative viewpoints about the effects of
their rules.8 0
Similarly, the interest representation model for administrative law
seeks legitimacy, in the absence of agreement about desirable ends, by
recreating a political process for resolution of problems by enhancing
representation of affected interests. 8 The interest representation model
arose in response to the recognition that neither legislative directives
nor expertise controlled an agency's discretion. Since neither legislation
nor knowledge dictated substantive outcomes, courts sought to en-
courage agencies to make fairer decisions by expanding intervention
and standing rights, and by requiring agencies to consider all relevant
viewpoints.82 Similarly, a justification for reforms in judicial reception
of legislative facts is that previously formulated rules do not dictate
substantive outcomes. Given the inevitability of judicial discretion,
fairer decisions will result if courts receive various viewpoints as to the
effects of the legal rules they create.8
Reforming judicial procedures to encourage consideration of all
viewpoints is fine if we view pragmatic balancing as the best way for
77. See Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency?, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 592, 620-21 (1985).
78. Since Professor Davis is somewhat agnostic about the merits of psychological parent the-
ories that are the focus of her study, her call for reform relies on the claim that it would be fairer
to present opposing viewpoints. Davis, supra note 2, at 1549, 1553-54, 1603.
79. Davis, supra note 2, at 1598-1602; Karst, supra note 3, at 106, 111; see Miller & Barron,
supra note 4, at 1199-1200; see also Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1294, 1302 (1976) (fact inquiry in public law litigation not historical and adju-
dicative but predictive and legislative).
80. Miller & Barron, supra note 4, at 1240-42, 1244 (stating that "[t]he Justices should do
their best to inform themselves about all relevant data concerning a given issue of great public
interest").
81. Stewart, supra note 71, at 1760.
82. Id. at 1723, 1757.
83. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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courts to make decisions, and wish to encourage courts to do more prag-
matic balancing by enhancing the procedures for evaluating empirical
causation. But, as Professor Richard Stewart has observed in the con-
text of administrative process, formalizing judicial mechanisms for con-
sideration of all affected interests will accentuate the polycentric and
unique qualities of each decision. 4 Professor Karst's litany of questions
that he believes would illuminate constitutional decisions s5 bears this
out. 6 For example, Professor Karst believes the court's decision as to
whether Detroit's enforcement of a criminal antismoke ordinance vio-
lated the commerce clause would be illuminated by legislative fact
presentations on the following issues:
What is the danger to the inhabitants of Detroit from air pollution? What losses of
health and property have resulted, before and after the adoption and enforcement
of the ordinance? What dangers would result if Detroit were to exempt from the
ordinance those sources of smoke which are impossible to eliminate without adding
substantially to the cost of interstate commerce? Is other equipment available
which would permit Huron to comply with the ordinance? How much would it cost
Huron to comply? How many other federally licensed vessels which operate in De-
troit are equipped with the same kind of boiler?
87
Professor Stewart has questioned the ability of an interest repre-
sentation model to legitimate administrative process.88 The interest
representation model is even less capable of legitimating judicial pro-
cess because the political branches have a much stronger claim that
they can determine the majority's desires."' Even if courts can be seen
as reweighing the legislative balance to assure representation of under-
represented interests, these interests are likely to receive better protec-
tion from principles and precedent rather than ad hoc balancing of the
effects of legal rules. 90 If courts simply sought legitimacy through dupli-
cation of the legislative process, they ultimately would put themselves
out of business.
84. Stewart, supra note 71, at 1777, 1785, 1788-89; cf. D. HoROwrrz, supra note 3, at 284
(social science may introduce "complexities that shake the judge's confidence in imposed solu-
tions"); Levin, Education, Life Chances, and the Courts: The Role of Social Science Evidence, 39
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 217, 237-39 (1975) (use of social science by both sides may redefine issues;
for example, the case for school desegregation may be seen as hinging on improvement in student
test scores); Tribe, supra note 23, at 1366 (mathematical proof may tend to shift focus to issues
that lend themselves to mathematical treatment).
85. Karst, supra note 3, at 82-83, 85, 98.
86. Although it can be argued that ad hoc balancing is the best way to decide the best inter-
ests of children in child custody disputes, Professor Davis seeks to derive generalizable results
from her study.
87. Karst, supra note 3, at 98. Professor Regan has suggested alternatives to pragmatic bal-
ancing in dormant commerce clause cases. Regan, supra note 42, at 1092-93.
88. See Stewart, supra note 71, at 1789-90.
89. Cf. P. FREUND, supra note 11, at 91 (indicating that "[p]erhaps the right place for non-
legal experts in constitutional law is in the legislative process").
90. See Aleinikoff, supra note 38, at 984-86; Regan, supra note 42, at 1161-66.
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VI. CONCLUSION
One cannot argue against courts knowing more about the effects of
their legal rules without sounding like a fundamentalist. I am not argu-
ing, however, for judicial ignorance but rather against procedures that
would increase the sway of a particular method of decisionmaking that
makes the judicial process more like administrative and legislative
processes. The current, haphazard method of receiving legislative facts,
which creates its own incentives for counter-presentations over time, is
preferable to a more rationalized approach to judicial reception of legis-
lative facts that holds no promise of encouraging principled
decisionmaking.
